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Domains of Peace: Cyberspace and the First Global Expression
Without War
Abstract
The ongoing war in Ukraine appears to validate war as it always is. A look at the evolution
of domains offers something different. When this step is taken, it becomes clear that
humanity chooses the violence defining war. Cyber realities today reveal how technological
innovation has stymied war, taking humanity into a pre-existing condition repudiating war
and leaving cyberspace as the first global expression without war. Once accepting that
truth, nations can contemplate the discovery of a domain offering an expression of peace as
a cognitive battlespace overrides the physical application of use of force. This feat means
peace finds an equal footing with war. To accept that reality so clearly manifest in the
prospect of a digital peace presents a referendum on humanity bending to circumstance or
twisting reality to remain in a warzone.
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Introduction
The U.S. military and the militaries of other nations currently operate in
the cyber domain, one existing alongside the land, sea, air, and space. As
military thinkers sought victory in war, that goal took them from one
domain to the next. When matched on land, they looked to the sea and
from the sea to the air, and when symmetry found them there, space
enticed them with truly global aspirations of finding and maintaining a
military advantage. This pursuit of asymmetry meant warfare engulfed
each new domain. In so doing, the military imperative crowded out the
more benevolent civilian side that also existed in each domain. It was not
that the violence effaced the other existence, but that a military primacy
overtook civilian activities in each domain: There would always be war as
part of the human condition, so one had to mount a defense in each
domain.
The preeminence of military affairs stops in cyberspace since belligerents
cannot militarize the cyber domain with an act of violence offering a
compelling reason online existence is the first global expression without
war. Whatever action might unfold in that domain, no one dies. At most,
this woe comes to humanity as a second or third order effect. Without
violence as a first order effect, the coexistence of military acts and the
civilian enterprise falters as the technology accessing cyberspace delivers a
reprieve from war as defined by violence. The change is monumental. If, in
the past, technology had enabled humanity to wage war in a domain, now
the evolution marking cyberspace means an arena where there is no war.
Just how people should cope with the cyber reality is uncertain and that
debate is ongoing. Those seeking to better understand cyberspace adopt
comparisons to the other domains to better understand the new
phenomenon they have identified. These observers pursue an unusual
analysis, a claim to something new but acknowledging that they cannot
understand fully that new thing unless one reaches for something else and
for something familiar stemming from the past. With this lens, the sea or
the air offers context leading to a better understanding of cyberspace.1
That point of reaching backward to offer a comparison while going
forward exposes such thinking as a hope to define war as it always has
been.
1
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Of course, one could argue that while a cyber war takes place without
violence, a means of coercion is still possible in cyberspace. Further, cyber
realities augment ongoing acts of war because of actions across domains
that impact existing human conflict. Assessing the standalone war in
cyberspace helps resolve any ambiguity by understanding if and how
cyberspace is an avenue of war and not peace. To put this in terms of what
this means for cyber warfare, initially, cyberspace was a positive element.2
Now it has a more menacing side.3 Analysts could say the same of all other
domains, however. Therefore, weighing domains can lead one to seek a
test of arms outside the area of cyberspace, rather than accept the virtue of
the cyber domain. That truth remains inviolate and points to the thesis of
this article: That cyberspace stands to remain a domain without violence,
prompting humanity to contemplate the implications when war is no
longer a part of the human condition. This development offers a cohesion
to a space demanding an identity born of an emerging cyber reality
confronting humanity with an avenue of peace rebuking the endless belief
there will always be war.

Land to Sea
To emphasize land as a domain of war signifies purity of conflict.
Belligerents had the potential to contain war in this domain where it would
remain a practice involving only a few. Unfortunately, land conflict would
be a history of the erosion of this sentiment. That ideal may never have
existed except as an ideal—Greek feats of arms coming closest. A land
struggle constituted a contest of man versus man. While empires
assembled armies, the Greeks never lost sight of the spectacle of single
combat. Even during a great struggle, duels emerged to underscore this
desired end. Homer’s The Iliad recounts the most famous clash as that of
the Trojan Hector facing the Greek hero Achilles. There was no suspense
here; Achilles’ near complete invulnerability, no matter his one weakness,
sealed Hector’s demise. The drama came from the human futility of the
struggle, a noble warrior bested by a disgruntled and petulant killer. This
saga was the fate of man. Conflict and the means to settle that conflict
were a reality, a condition that would never go away. Permanence was an
admission that war possessed limits much as humans did. The violence
besetting mankind was the bad news, a willingness to try and contain this
violence the good news. Humanity should be able to exist on land in peace,
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that is, free of the fear of destruction. That outcome would never occur,
but still represented an aspiration.
War on land always generated strife and bloodshed prompting warfighters
to find an advantage in another domain. If land warfare had proscribed
suffering and a concomitant loss of any promise of achieving peace in that
domain, then perhaps another domain could recover a lost good fortune.
Controlling or more overcoming the sea spelled an obvious advantage in
terms of something more than fighting. To travel at sea meant an
expansive horizon beckoned with a discovery of new lands and peoples
that in turn spoke to new possibilities. This exchange, trade, had a sinister
side—conquest—and the need for security trumped a potential
benevolence. A belligerent could force an adversary to capitulate if one
state denied another resource; and one could mount an effective challenge
to a rival if gaining access to resources. There also was the possibility that
any clash could be almost bloodless if kept to a contest for resources. The
ability to assert naval power promised to bring wars to a conclusion short
of violence. A standalone sea domain representing something more than
war did not die from a lack of possibility, but from the choice of mixing
land and sea power to gain resources. The state that could do that best
possessed a clear advantage in any war.
How to make that claim was more problematic, a question of how to draw
a boundary separating rivals at sea. Combatants solved the problem by not
drawing a line at all. Via a projection of power with a vague claim, but real
enough to mark states with such capability and to benefit from that reach,
eventually humanity brought the seas under control and international
norms and laws guide their use today. Controlling the open sea meant
ordering the domain for war, less controlling territory. Bringing order
prepared this surface for commercial or military communications that are
“part of the life of the nation” and doing so via “commerce prevention.”4 In
these conditions, the push for asymmetry first brought military advantage,
then symmetry, and then a constant state of war at sea. Just as true is that
war and peace coexist in the sea domain, the civilian need for interaction
there as real as the military demand to secure the sea lanes to protect a
state’s vitality. To follow the comparison to cyberspace, the same evolution
can and will descend on the cyber domain, bringing this domain under
control.
3
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The sea domain represents something positive about human nature.
Nations could use sea power to circumvent war on land, should one accept
the expansive nature of oceans and therefore too formidable to control
even without opposition. Conflict escalated once the sea became a
warfighting domain as war became a much broader enterprise, so much to
make the new domain merely an extension of the old. Soon, the struggle at
sea spanned the globe and it was evident nations could not separate land
and sea from one another. Which domain held ascendancy was unclear,
and answers to this question varied depending on one’s geographical
disposition. Land powers arose and faced opposition from sea powers. A
neat division did not exist, the two domains clearly mutually dependent on
one another, but a domination of one domain or the other led a nation to
believe it could win a war.5
The ties between the two domains were inescapable in the need to advance
military power all in the name of protecting the interests of the state. That
that purpose could lie in the now overtly military aims of domain
integration betrayed the hope for human sagacity in the progression of
domains as a shallow one. The trajectory amounted to more frequent,
more extensive conflict, and a defacing of the human condition as a result.
This outcome surfaced when Europe reached outside its borders and
embarked on a discovery of new worlds in a process known as the “rise of
the west.”6 That engagement soon spoke to exploitation, a one-sided
exchange revealing sea power as an engine of war, less a means of bridging
difference among humanity. More so, domination of the sea domain
fostered and sustained great inequalities among nations that advanced
regional differences in terms of economic prowess that then amounted to
the power to subjugate. Any sense of shared global purpose faded quickly
to meet this act of militarism.

Air
The air domain shares with the sea that quality of being open and the
difficulty to claim ascendancy for this reason. The need and ability to
militarize the domain offers a further parallel. No sooner had humanity
embarked on flight than the need arose among states to apply that space
as a means of war. As a result, the prospect of air travel was beset always
by ambiguity as promising harm and hope, vice and virtue. As on land and
4
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at sea, in the air, military thinking and, therefore, the base reality of war,
won out, and a loss of human standing came with that result.
The expansive nature of the air domain almost redeemed the situation.
Should flight become a global enterprise, the future would become less
certain because the world would be a smaller place as air travel connected
peoples, hitherto disparate and remote. This thinking meant air power
started with an optimism that a greater understanding among nations
could arise from the unprecedented instrument of connectivity at hand. 7
The United States particularly embraced this sentiment. The euphoria
surrounding the airplane and serving connectivity increasingly backed
United States global expansion to serve “world peace and prosperity.”8
That promise turned menacing within a generation. By the end of the First
World War in 1918, air power had received a baptism of fire, as it were, a
weapon with great promise, something foes would feature in the next war.
A rush to tap this potential came next, defining military regimes
blossoming in the 1930s. All nations recognized air power’s potential as an
offensive weapon and its chief target, civilians. By raining down
destruction from the air, some experts declared that a nation could win a
war through air power alone. Perhaps best known, Italian general Giulio
Douhet infamously offered this boast in the 1920s.9 A mixed impact
happened.10 No matter, here was a monstrous application of warfare in the
domain of air, and combatants targeting previously sheltered civilian
populations became routine in the Second World War. It was a sad and
stunning development. Air power did not win the next war, the Second
World War, by itself, and even claims of having forced the war’s early
termination were suspect; it may have strengthened enemy resolve.11 What
it did do with certainty was destroy the promise of flight. That benevolence
had died by 1945 and did so at the hands of the more virtuous powers
waging that war, that of Britain and the United States, as these democratic
states unleashed air armadas to sap enemy morale. Militarization of the
new domain of air had exacted a heavy price in idealism.
That cost always had dogged the human interaction in any domain. As if
sensing a moment slipping away in the air, air power became an ambitious
commercial enterprise in the post-War era.12 The civilian application of the
technology came forward despite the world conflagrations that
accompanied its development. Commercial flight did this by striking
5
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another blow at the freedom of the skies, and so even as air power became
something more than a referendum on military prowess, its connectivity,
what its promise rested upon, became more constrained. To make air
travel possible, a state had to control the air. And this is what happened,
the freedom of the open skies much constrained as a means of facilitating
transnational flight. Airports, commercial air lines, international air space
meant the skies became as controlled as the seas. Charting that abstraction
tamed openness again and any need to consider exploration a feat of
discovering the means to reside in such a space. Visionaries could hope to
order a vastness now signifying human accomplishment as overcoming the
awe of operating in that expansive domain. The grandiosity of the domain
marked a love of technology as providing answers to the human condition,
less enjoyment at accepting one’s place in the world as but a small
contributor to a greater existence. With that conceit, regrettably, war, not
human enterprise, remained the foremost reason to move from one
domain to another. Greater interaction was possible, but so too greater
threats.
Another blow to the air as an embodiment of the human spirit came from
advancing technology that soon called into question manned flight. This
desire grew from strictly military requirements reminding observers that
the blossoming of civilian flight had fallen behind the menacing
development of a new and better application of war. It was no small irony
that developing weapons delivered from the air that no longer required inflight human guidance demolished any concept of freedom in the skies and
the connectively because of this freedom. Air as a domain of war had
become a nightmare, not a blessing. When nuclear weapons met missile
technology, the manifestation of human ambition in terms of air travel had
become the most dangerous referendum on war: Air as the ultimate
domain of war. What began with a promise had turned ideals to ash in a
concrete reality of the skies above.13 Mastering war in the air was a
devastating commentary on humanity’s embrace of technology.

Space
Things appeared to get worse in the domain of space. It was hard to track
any optimism in space travel, and doom shrouded both civilian and
military applications of this prospect. Fortunately, what was to be space
never became a defined entity; it may well have represented a domain of
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war, but what it could and should do for both civilians and military forces
alike was not clear, nor has it become clear.14 United States Space Force
doctrine seeks this clarity by offering “guiding principles” via “unified
space action.”15 Instead, whatever could have greeted a human venture
beyond the planet in space spoke more to a failure of optimism, although
for different reasons than that which afflicted the air domain.
The military realities peaked early. Delivering nuclear strikes from space
merely reinforced the existing reality of nuclear destruction. The fear was
already widespread and could not get shockingly worse. A more positive
utilization of the domain of space might have been satellite technology that
could offer unprecedented monitoring of nations, and thereby curb
weapon accumulation and deployment. Such sentiment made possible by
technology had come too late; weapons were advanced and increasingly
deadly. Spying from space became an effort to search for new ways of war,
not to curb the old. It was disappointing, but not shattering. Observers did
not lose optimism more than they found hope dashed before it gained
momentum.
This evolution meant that space offered a chance for civilian revival. It
failed to materialize, however, although it dissipated more slowly than did
the fears surrounding a militarization of space. The human triumph of
putting a man on the moon recalled the early optimism of air travel.16 It
was a pioneering endeavor, and it came from the nation that represented,
at least in its own world-view, the best of humanity. Americans had
conquered the limitations of human existence, and hope came with that
feat. Some ability to build on this accomplishment arose in the wake of the
moon landings, as the United States pursued a more consistent human
presence in space with the space station and space shuttle program.
Repeated flights, not a seemingly desperate stab into space by a disposable
craft, pointed to some promise of space travel, but it remained no more
than a promise. What was the destination, and not too far from this
question came another, what was the purpose? A look into human origins
by possibly finding answers in distant places did not sustain American
interest. United States citizens recoiled before the hope of something
great and yet to be discovered, a failure to embrace discovery that might
have led them to believe in something beyond the apparent emptiness of
space. It was an epic intellectual collapse given the nation’s founding
7
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rooted in an act of discovery that required this continued outlook if that
initial act was to be more than brazen conquest.17
The Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters did not in themselves
cripple space travel or American resolve to carry the torch of this pursuit.
Americans eventually faltered, balking at reaching into a domain that
offered only a vague appeal to human promise alongside an altered
recollection of warfare.18 Science fiction articulated possible showdowns
with extraterrestrial beings, even contacts inviting the earth’s destruction
should such creatures covet the world humans inhabited on earth. These
worries remained mostly fantasy, and with no military peril found in
space, and the existing means there to make war merely reinforcing the
established fears of nuclear Armageddon, the hope of advancing civilian
purpose in space by conquering a frontier that further defined the
connectivity of humanity, this altruism faded as well.
The world hardly raised an outcry. In space, after some fifty years, the
American people gave up on its optimism there, announcing that death
with an abandonment of the shuttle program and offering at best,
unmanned travel to take its place. That the American nation, prideful of
having pioneered air as a domain of hope, had given up this pursuit by
accepting limitations in space, or defaulting in terms of looking for sources
of new optimism, meant that the world followed suit. Privatizing space
travel arrested this trajectory, to a point. Immensely large, wealthy
corporations continued developing space travel as a possibility for
humanity. These efforts, most prominently led by Elon Musk and his
corporation SpaceX, fell to just a handful of individuals possessing great
financial means.19 A few nations also continued space exploration, but they
were rivals to the United States, such as China and Russia, and therefore
nations with assumed narrow aspirations, less orchestrating an enterprise
on behalf of humanity. While that assumption may prove false, explorers
now defined a frontier in space as an area for but a few. This rarefied act of
discovery meant humanity clearly responded to fears of space with a belied
indifference more than a wide call to seek out the unknown there. The
baseness in that outlook measured limitation as a defining attribute of
space, a willingness to retreat from expansive thought and instead accept
solace in limitation.
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Cyberspace
That limitation fed the constant of war. Dreams of standalone conflict
drove each domain, warfighters seeking to win a war via an application of
force in one domain independent from the rest. These hopes proved
fleeting. Starving a population in a city by a siege, starving an entire nation
by denying it access to the sea, destroying a center of commerce via the air,
or terrifying a civilian population into capitulation via the same means,
failed to produce a surrender. Air power alone proved as deficient at
defeating an enemy as when projecting naval power. No state has
attempted such an effort in space. In each case, points of control proved
possible—bases for launching a strike and hitting a few key targets, in
between an expanse that foes could ignore whether ocean, air, or space.
Always the idea of wanting to go past the current domain matters most
because here lay military advantage. History said otherwise. Warfare
produced new dimensions but less conviction as to what these domains
meant to determining conflict other than the certainty that warring states
must weigh all domains together to net the best possible result in war. This
totality equaled the failure of human ambition.
Cyber rejects this trajectory. Cyber’s most unsettling quality is not
delivering this familiar understanding of cross domain interaction and,
instead, reasserting the prospect of a standalone war in one domain to win
any war, a confrontation that marginalizes the other domains.20 The
development of cyberspace renders the land domain obsolete, no more
than an archaic notion of warfare eclipsed by technology. Perhaps it is true
that conflict on land possesses a longer history than the other domains. If
so, that longevity again references the troublesome quality of cyberspace
since that new domain can cast doubt on what warfighters understand and
accept as sound. There is no more truism than the idea of having to win on
land to win a war. Eventually, conquest must unfold, and ground troops
must occupy territory as the mainstay of war. Cyberspace presents a
different view of conquest. In this domain, cognitive dominance subsumes
all other acts of war leading to an intellectual exchange that obviates any
notion of war as resting on violence. For this reason, a standalone war in
cyberspace answers to civilians, a novel development in the history of
domains.

9
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The label of a cyber domain implies the completion of a maturation period
and that such a process unfolded for each of the recognized domains.
Following the trajectory of the various domains is crucial for it spells out
the pattern of military analysis coming at the expense of a more complete
understanding, suggesting that civilians paid a price when military
thinkers developed domains to better contemplate acts of war. More than
any military analysis, determining the primacy of civilian ascendancy in
cyberspace matters most, a staple present there but lost in the other
domains. This fact makes cyber a unique domain for blunting a military
emphasis. In short, domains have become increasingly hard to define as a
battlespace because the violence defining war increasingly goes away as
one moves from land, to sea, to air, to space, and finally to cyberspace.
To mark the evolution of the thinking of domains, one sees humans
determined to bring predictability to each of them. Rules, norms, controls
became accepted at sea, so the expanse of the oceans did not seem as open
as visionaries believed. A military superiority at sea could well mean
physical control of the seas. The same end befell air power. Open skies
became clearly delineated spaces with its own set of rules. Air superiority
went from terrorizing an enemy state into submission to keeping the foe at
bay, in each respect a bald-faced rebuke of openness. Remarkably,
predictability became a constant at sea and in the air, and that same
constant arose in space due to limited access to but a handful of states or
private businesses with the means to act there. Here was a tremendous
human accomplishment, these frontiers now rarefied, controlled, and
restricted, if one believed in shrinking from further consideration of what
it meant to be human.
This trajectory of domains also meant that military applications
dominated them and reflected the progress of humanity. This result could
only be a negative, as it dampened the human condition. Space testified
loudest to this failing, humans shrinking from discovery about the
universe, the earth, and themselves. Even if the earth stood alone, a
possible outcome of space exploration, did this insight mean conflict was
the human norm? Giving up on space exploration meant accepting the
result of war without the attempt at finding something better. A similar
disappointment came to airpower, the military application of flight
standing alongside that of commercial airpower. The shared time meant
an admission of strife as a human norm. And sea power, far from offering
10
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a break from land conflict, only served to set the idea of conflict further in
relief as strangling an opponent via economic deprivation became a key
goal. Openness suffered in each case, no matter the growing possibilities of
connectivity in each domain.
Today, many of those thinking about cyberspace are pushing things in this
direction of diminishing openness so that the unknown of cyber becomes a
known as in the tradition of the other domains. The artificiality of these
norms makes one wonder what might have been. Economic exchange at
sea may well have quieted conflict on land. Connecting the globe via flight
may well have healed a world reeling from conflict on a global scale. And
space travel may well have encouraged all of humanity to start again and
rediscover itself in a context of humility before a greater good speaking to
human potentiality as more than strife and bloodshed. None of this
happened as military possibilities trumped civilian aspirations. This is not
to say that military leaders held complete sway and dictated this result. It
is to say that the evolution of domains makes plain that leadership in all
nations gave up on the redeeming quality of human existence and
prepared for war.
For this reason, one would not want cyberspace to follow this trajectory,
and it has not to this point. The sum of this domain is a de facto norm of
optimism, a championing of bold tidings that has again found a voice on
behalf of the world. For here, war cannot be based on violent acts. Try as
they might, neither civilian nor military leaders can ascribe this condition
to that domain. This break means the task of better understanding the
unknown of cyberspace cannot sit easily in an understanding of the other
domains. It is worth the effort, however, to grasp the undue military
influence in ascendancy in each domain, and that it did not have to be this
way. It cannot be that way in cyberspace. The more hope displaces
violence in a domain, the less there is war there.21
That assurance fades in cyberspace where a proliferation of tools means
unprecedented access by state actors and rouge entities as well. This view
sparks the fear that what is new will undo all that is worthwhile in making
sure that warfare today does not become too much a violent enterprise.
This valid fear confronts the speculation compounding the uncertainty of
measuring the implications of conflict in cyberspace and thereby driving to
great heights anxiety about the arrival of cyberspace as a domain.22 Those
11
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assessing cyberspace offer relief, that even with increased access, the idea
of cyber revolutionizing conflict is not on the horizon, nor has it arrived. A
study of domains as an avenue of war means that cyber is new, but that
little has changed. The fact that war is not the path forward in this space
means humanity has marginalized war, finally, once stripped of violence
and reduced to the tension growing from conflict and peace coexisting in
the cyber domain. For this reason, online existence is the first global
expression without war. In turn, humanity can contemplate how best to
rise to the challenge of seeking existence in a world where technology has
sanctified the benevolence inherent in living. A turn towards this optimism
must go through cyberspace.
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